Time Order
Davison and Krassa see whites fleeing to the G O P because of an increased black presence in the Democratic party. Blacks have come to constitute a larger share of Democratic voters in congressional elections, according to Davison and Krassa, as a result of the mobiliza tion and shift in party allegiance of the black electorate. Survey re search has shown that since 1964, southern black voters have over whelmingly identified with the Democratic party and have supported its presidential nominees frequently at rates of 90 percent or better. Similar figures probably obtain for congressional elections. Davison and Krassa see the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as the stimulus for the larger black role in the Democratic party which, they claim, prom pted whites to foresake the party of their ancestors. The authors choose to explore shifts in party voting in congressional elections on the rationale that since the Voting Rights Act (VRA) was approved by Congress, unhappy white southerners will direct their anger at Dem ocratic con gressional candidates. For many southerners, partisan differences on civil rights be came salient before enactm ent of the VRA. The 1964 presidential election which caused a critical realignment of blacks to the Demo cratic party (Campbell 1977 ) also resulted in unprecedented numbers o f whites voting Republican in the states at the heart of Davison and Krassa's study. Barry G oldw ater's opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 produced a bum per crop of Republicans across the D eep South and established the pattern under which states covered by the VRA 's trigger have voted Democratic in only one presidential election in the last seven elections.1 G oldw ater's coattails elected the first Republi can H ouse members in Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi, and influ enced the post-election switch of A lbert W atson in South Carolina. N orth Carolina and Virginia had been electing Republicans to the H ouse regularly since 1952.
T he Goldw ater campaign is im portant to an understanding of w hite support for Republican congressional candidates for two rea sons. First, the Goldw ater candidacy inaugurated a series of presiden tial campaigns aimed at winning support among white southerners. Positions adopted by Republican presidential candidates pursuant to a southern strategy were also embraced by Republican congressional candidates.
Second, G oldw ater's success in the D eep South, along with Nixon's victory in the Rim South in 1968 and his sweep of the South four years later, encouraged growing numbers of congressional aspi rants to run as Republicans. A fter 1964, the num ber of congressional districts contested by the G O P increased substantially. As shown in Table 1 , most districts in the covered states were not contested by the G O P in 1962. In subsequent elections, at least 70 percent of the districts had a Republican candidate. W hen there was not a Republi can on the ballot, all voters who registered preferences voted for the D em ocratic candidate.
T he shift to the G O P began before adoption of the VRA and while it may have been linked to issues of race, it is far from clear that the shift was a reaction to a growing black presence within the Demo cratic party. Certainly rejection of the Democratic party in congres sional contests comes several elections after the VRA. Davison and K rassa's Figure 1 shows that the proportion of the white votes going to D em ocratic candidates was higher in both 1966 and 1970 than in any of the previous four off-year elections. Even as late as 1974, the Demo cratic share o f the vote was in line with that tallied in off-year elections 
Ecological Fallacy
Davison and Krassa seek to explore voting preferences of whites at three levels of education: high, medium and low. The esti mates for these sets of whites are derived through ecological regression for different sets of counties. We have here a classic example o f the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950) . The authors interpret their results as indicating levels of partisan support among whites having high, middle and low levels of education. Such inferences are not justified based upon analyses of the aggregate level data used when the county is the unit of analysis. The authors may be able to say something about the behavior of whites in counties having different levels of education. To say that whites in counties with higher levels of education vote in a particular way is not the same as saying that better educated whites support the Republican party at a certain level. The problem is that within each of the three strata of counties, there are whites spread across the continuum of education. With county-level data, we cannot know w hether the G O P is drawing its support from whites who have high, middle, or low levels of education.
Even if we amend the authors' interpretations of Figures 2 and 3 to speak o f white voting patterns in counties of differing levels of education, the Davison and Krassa interpretation is suspect. They seemingly concentrate primarily on Figure 3 , which shows counties having lower levels o f education surging to the top.
To determ ine the relative levels of G O P support for the three sets o f counties, data from Figures 2 and 3 must be considered simulta neously. In Table 2 , I present data obtained by eyeballing the two figures. The numbers in the columns for Dem ocratic and Republican support are based on what appear to be the data points in the figures and consequently may be slightly off. For each set of counties, a third column has been calculated to show Republican support as a percent age of R epublican plus Dem ocratic support. This table reveals that in each post-V R A contest, Republican candidates got greater support in counties having the highest education levels. Indeed, by 1978, counties with the least educated whites were also the counties in which Republi can candidates fared least well.
To summarize, Davison and Krassa have not developed esti mates o f G O P support for whites having different levels of education. They present estim ates o f G O P support in counties having different levels o f education. Second, contrary to the Davison and Krassa inter pretation, the G O P has not done best in the least-educated counties.
The Focus on the House
As has been previously suggested, the rationale for focusing on the U.S. H ouse is less than compelling. D eep South whites took first revenge on Lyndon Johnson who, as president, pushed through the Civil Rights Act o f 1964. Southern whites' rejection o f Democratic presidential nominees has been more persistent and pervasive than the rejection of Democratic congressional candidates. And why should 
Split-Level Partisan Identification
The last generation has seen the em ergence of a num ber of voters who classify themselves as Georgia Dem ocrats (Perkins and Guynes 1976) or Alabama Democrats (C otter and Stovall 1986). This type of self-identification suggests that the voter will support his/her party's nominees for state and local offices while voting for the nomi nee of the opposing party for president. Charles Hadley (1985) discov ered a number of split identifiers even among the political elites who attend party conventions. O thers have since found that in at least some of the states studied by Davison and Krassa (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky), the proportion of split-identifiers is even higher in the general electorate than among party delegates (C otter and Stovall 1986; Maggiotto and Wekkin 1987,1989; Jewell 1987) . As anticipated, such split-identifiers are less likely to vote for their party's presidential nom inee than are those who experienced no cross-pressures (Hadley 1985; W ekkin 1991) .
If the Davison-Krassa thesis of white flight from the Demo cratic party is correct, then their projections for partisan behavior should obtain at levels other than congressional elections. It would seem to follow that in counties that have sizable black populations, m ore whites should have abandoned the Dem ocratic party than in counties in which there are fewer blacks. O f course, as noted earlier, for a G O P preference among whites to be visible, the opportunity to support Republican candidates must be present. If whites are rejecting the D em ocratic party then it would be reasonable for politically ambi tious whites to run as Republicans. W e hypothesize that the propor tion black in the county will be positively related to the proportion of R epublican candidacies and their success for local office, if the Davi son-Krassa hypothesis is correct. Table 3 presents data for South Carolina testing these hy potheses. South Carolina is chosen because it makes readily available general election data on county offices -something not published for the o th er states subject to Section 5. T he counties are divided into five categories based on the proportion black in the population in the 1970 census. W e see that rather than Republican candidacies being more frequent in heavily black counties, just the opposite pattern exists. In 1974, almost a decade after the VRA, only 2 percent of the offices in majority black counties attracted Republicans while in the most heavily white counties, more than two-thirds of the offices featured Republi can candidacies. G O P successes are rare in all categories of counties.
Local election data from South Carolina provide no support for the Davison-Krassa proposition that blacks are driving whites out o f the D em ocratic party. Indeed, we suspect that the research done by Bullock (1988) showing that Republicans do best at the presidential level, and less well at lower levels, is an accurate portrayal. The level of Republicanism captured by Davison and Krassa is conditioned by the office considered. Had they looked at presidential elections, they would have observed more widespread Republicanism, but had their focus been on state or local offices, less G O P support would have been seen. W hite support for the G O P is, to a degree not acknowledged by Davison and Krassa, a reaction to the availability o f Republican candi dates and not due to blacks supporting Democrats. 
Is "White Flight" the Proper Analogy?
"White flight" is a term often applied to racial transition in neighborhoods and schools. It connotes a rapid transform ation from predominantly white to predominantly, or even almost universally, black. If speed and degree of change are hallmarks of white flight, then the concept is not well-adapted to the partisan change of D eep South whites.
Consensus does not exist among those who study party identifi cation of southern whites. Some, such as Beck (1971) , have concluded from the large numbers of independents that, rather than realigning with the GOP, southern whites have dealigned. Black and Black (1987) observe that the South lacks a majority party and, instead, has three minority groupings: Democrats, Republicans and Independents. Some more recent survey data suggest that more southern whites may profess allegiance to the G O P than to the D em ocratic party (K eene and Ladd 1991) . Wolfinger and Hagen (1985) , Carmines and Stimson (1989), and Campbell (1971) all see a realignment.
W hether realignment, dealignment, or a hybrid thereof, all ob servers agree that the changes in white allegiance and behavior have been so gradual that the former would have to be admitted at best a secular realignment (Key 1959) . Figures on partisan officeholding in the South also show only a gradual increase in Republican success (Bullock 1988) . Millions of whites in the South continue to vote Democratic, with Democrats continuing to dom inate elections below the presidency.
Although whites are indeed foresaking the Democratic party, the rate of change is much slower than the term "flight" implies. R ather than leaving on a jet plane, the departure is more at the pace of a municipal bus. Indeed, declining Democratic identification may have relatively little to do with racial attitudes. After reviewing works on either side of the issue, Stanley and Castle (1988) conclude that survey research provides little evidence of a white backlash (also see Wolfinger and Hagen 1985) . O ther factors widely cited as predictive of partisan identification in the South, but not examined by Davison and Krassa, include generational replacement, in-migration and dissatisfac tion with a wide array of G reat Society programs.
A nother source of greater liberalism within the Democratic party in the South has stemmed from the need for Democratic nomi nees to court black support. Dem ocrats elected in recent years, par ticularly those competing statewide, have had to fashion biracial coali tions. This has resulted in most congressional southern Democrats voting for the 1982 extension of the V RA and against the confirmation of R obert Bork to serve on the Suprem e Court, to cite two examples. Southern Republicans in Congress generally have been less supportive o f civil rights and liberal programs (Bullock 1981; 1985; Nye and Bul lock 1992) . Currently, southern Dem ocrats are feeling cross-pressured by the necessity of addressing minority concerns about recent Supreme C ourt rulings affecting employment practices, on the one hand, and by the fear that the G O P will run ads similar to the anti-affirmative action commercial used effectively by Jesse Helms (R-NC) in his 1990 reelection bid, on the other.
Still, the accumulation of white votes by Republicans comes slowly. Even in South Carolina, where the 1990 G O P ticket was headed by the legendary Strom Thurmond and where incumbent Re publican G overnor Carroll Campbell faced a weak black state senator, the G O P gained neither congressional nor state legislative seats.2
The Future
The G O P currently is seeking to tie the Democratic party more closely to blacks. Senator Phil G ram m 's (R-TX) plans to link Dem ocratic senators seeking re-election in 1992 with quotas for mi nority hiring is part of that effort. W here Democrats nominate blacks, the same message will be transmitted to some white voters. Also, the product of the current round of redistrictings may link blacks with the Democratic party in some voters' minds. The Justice Department interprets the V RA as requiring that states maximize majority black congressional and legislative districts which will likely produce addi tional black Democratic nominees. Some of these may occur in districts in which the minority population is sufficient to nom inate a black but not sufficient to elect one, in which case a Republican wins. Elsewhere, the concentration o f blacks in one district will likely result in neighboring districts having concentrations of conservative whites who will elect Republicans (Brace, Grofman and Handley 1987; Bullock and Gaddie 1991) .
The factors associated with white drift toward the G O P are multiple and gradual. The ultimate result may be a predom inantly black Democratic party and a predominantly white Republican party, if G O P strategists succeed. That scenario has yet to arrive at the congressional level, although it already describes presidential voting in the South. 
